Theos-Talk Archives (October 2004 Message tt00084)

Dear Mauri,

That was a quote from Koshek's post on sophistry, so perhaps he can
comment further. But I will add in reference to my earlier comparison
of working on family and local history versus working on history that
is of some significance to religious believers. In the former case I
find a lot more indifference to results, that is people simply want to
know the truth without worrying about how it might make someone look
bad or affect our beliefs. Secular history can get into the same
trouble with sophistry however, with for example the furious
resistance of certain biographers and historians to the notion that
Jefferson had a sexual relationship with Sally Hemings. It "must have
been" false-- a "must" that came entirely from the need to keep a
belief system intact.

Whether or not there is "real impartiality" I don't know but I do know
that some people are more partial than others.

Cheers,

Paul

--- In theos-talk@yahoogroups.com, Mauri <mhart@i...> wrote:
> Paul wrote, in part: << Analysis is 
> indifferent to the results. It's
> only motive is to persue the truth 
> whever it may fall. >>
> 
> I suspect that any "analysis" is only as 
> impartial (in whatever sense) as the 
> basic assumptions that led to it, so how 
> can one's basic assumptions (per 
> karma/maya) in the form of one's 
> worldview, or in the form of whatever 
> offshoot of one's worldview, be seen as 
> impartial, except as per some basically 
> karmic/mayavic/conditional sense (not 
> that that kind of sense isn't often seen 
> as "true enough," obviously enough) ... 
> And not that one might not have 
> persuaded oneself that karma/maya and 
> conditional reality/truth doesn't leave 
> a lot of room for various kinds of 
> impartiality, in whatever creative 
> sense. So you might have a point there, 
> Paul, in your way. I personally don't 
> believe in any kind of "real 
> impartiality" for a second, though. In a 
> basic sense, I think that "impartiality" 
> could be used only conditionally, but 
> even there if the conditions are not all 
> known ... Who is to say/define what are 
> all of the conditions making up a given 
> conditional "truth"... Seems to me that, 
> basically, that's an impossible task. 
> Not that people, in general, aren't used 
> to lots of limited, creative 
> (karmic/mayavic) definitions for 
> conditional truths. So I think you 
> might have a point, there, Paul, in your 
> way, up to a point, but ...
> 
> Speculatively,
> Mauri