Theos-Talk Archives (June 2004 Message tt00179)

Is Bart a "true skeptic" or a "pseudo-skeptic"?? 

Dr. Marcello Truzzi, a well-known sociologist 
who has written on the claims of the paranormal, 
writes BELOW about the difference between a "true 
skeptic" and a "pseudo-skeptic." Notice Dr. 
Truzzi's repeated distinction between "plausibility" 
[or possibility] and "empirical evidence" (probability).
Compare this to what I have previously quoted from
the historians Barzun and Graff.

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The true skeptic takes an agnostic position, one 
that says the claim is not proved rather than 
disproved . He asserts that the claimant has not 
borne the burden of proof and that science must 
continue to build its cognitive map of reality 
without incorporating the extraordinary claim as 
a new "fact." Since the true skeptic does not 
assert a claim, he has no burden to prove anything. 
He just goes on using the established theories of 
"conventional science" as usual. But if a critic 
asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that 
he has a negative hypothesis --saying, for instance, 
that a seeming psi result was actually due to an 
artifact--he is making a claim and therefore also 
has to bear a burden of proof . Sometimes, such 
negative claims by critics are also quite 
extraordinary--for example, that a UFO was 
actually a giant plasma, or that someone in a 
psi experiment was cued via an abnormal ability 
to hear a high pitch others with normal ears 
would fail to notice. In such cases the negative 
claimant also may have to bear a heavier burden 
of proof than might normally be expected.

Critics who assert negative claims, but who mistakenly call 
themselves "skeptics," often act as though they have no burden of 
proof placed on them at all, though such a stance would be 
appropriate only for the agnostic or true skeptic. A result of this 
is that many critics seem to feel it is only necessary to present a 
case for their counter-claims based upon plausibility rather than 
empirical evidence. Thus, if a subject in a psi experiment can be 
shown to have had an opportunity to cheat, many critics seem to 
assume not merely that he probably did cheat, but that he must have, 
regardless of what may be the complete absence of evidence that he 
did so cheat and sometimes even ignoring evidence of the subject's 
past reputation for honesty. . . . 

Showing evidence is unconvincing is not grounds for completely 
dismissing it. If a critic asserts that the result was due to 
artifact X, that critic then has the burden of proof to demonstrate 
that artifact X can and probably did produce such results under such 
circumstances. Admittedly, in some cases the appeal to mere 
plausibility that an artifact produced the result may be so great 
that nearly all would accept the argument; for example, when we learn 
that someone known to have cheated in the past had an opportunity to 
cheat in this instance, we might reasonably conclude he probably 
cheated this time, too. But in far too many instances, the critic who 
makes a merely plausible argument for an artifact closes the door on 
future research when proper science demands that his hypothesis of an 
artifact should also be tested. Alas, most critics seem happy to sit 
in their armchairs producing post hoc counter-explanations. . . . 

. . . All of us must remember science can tell us what is empirically 
unlikely but not what is empirically impossible. Evidence in science 
is always a matter of degree and is seldom if ever absolutely 
conclusive. . . . Both critics and proponents need to learn to think 
of adjudication in science [and history] as more like that found in 
the law courts, imperfect and with varying degrees of proof and 
evidence. Absolute truth, like absolute justice, is seldom 
obtainable. We can only do our best to approximate them.
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