Theos-Talk Archives (May 2004 Message tt00015)

Saturday, May 01, 2004

 

Dear Friends:

 

Since suicide has been mentioned in recent postings I offer that
which HPB wrote on the subject, and its appropriate consequences.
This is what THEOSOPHY teaches.

 

Best wishes,

 

Dallas

 

 

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IS SUICIDE A CRIME?


by H. P. Blavatsky


[A LETTER and a REPLY]

 

THE writer in the London Spiritualist for November, who calls the
"Fragments of Occult Truth" speculation-spinning, can hardly, I
think, apply that epithet to Fragment No. 3, so cautiously is the
hypothesis concerning suicide advanced therein. Viewed in its
general aspect, the hypothesis seems sound enough, satisfies our
instincts of the Moral Law of the Universe, and fits in with our
ordinary ideas as well as with those we have derived from
science.

The inference drawn from the two cases cited, viz., that of the
selfish suicide on the one hand, and of the unselfish suicide on
the other, is that, although the after-states may vary, the
result is invariably bad, the variation consisting only in the
degree of punishment. It appears to me that, in arriving at this
conclusion, the writer could not have had in his mind's eye all
the possible cases of suicide, which do or may occur.

For I maintain that in some cases self-sacrifice is not only
justifiable, but also morally desirable, and that the result of
such self-sacrifice cannot possibly be bad. I will put one case,
perhaps the rarest of all rare cases, but not necessarily on that
account a purely hypothetical one, for I KNOW at least one man,
in whom I am interested, who is actuated with feelings, not
dissimilar to these I shall now describe, and who would be deeply
thankful for any additional light that could be thrown on this
darkly mysterious subject.--(See Editor's Note I . ) 

Suppose, then, that an individual, whom I shall call M., takes to
thinking long and deep on the vexed questions of the mysteries of
earthly existence, its aims, and the highest duties of man. To
assist his thoughts, he turns to philosophical works: notably
those dealing with the sublime teachings of Buddha. Ultimately he
arrives at the conclusion that the FIRST and ONLY aim of
existence is to be useful to our fellow men; that failure in this
constitutes his own worthlessness as a sentient human being, and
that by continuing a life of worthlessness he simply dissipates
the energy which he holds in trust, and which, so holding, he has
no right to fritter away. He tries to be useful, but--miserably
and deplorably fails. What then is his remedy? Remember there is
here "no sea of troubles" to "take arms against," no outraged
human law to dread, no deserved earthly punishment to escape; in
fact, there is no moral cowardice whatever involved in the
self-sacrifice. M. simply puts an end to an existence which is
useless, and which therefore fails of its own primary purpose. Is
his act not justifiable? Or must he also be the victim of that
transformation into spook and pisacha, against which Fragment No.
3 utters its dread warning? (2.) 

Perhaps, M. may secure at the next birth more favourable
conditions, and thus be better able to work out the purpose of
Being. Well, he can scarcely be worse; for, in addition to his
being inspired by a laudable motive to make way for one who might
be more serviceable, he has not, in this particular case, been
guilty of any moral turpitude. (3.) 

But I have not done. I go a step further and say that M. is not
only useless, but positively mischievous. To his incapacity to do
good, he finds that he adds a somewhat restless disposition which
is perpetually urging him on to make an effort to do good. M.
makes the effort--he would be utterly unworthy the name of man if
he did not make it--and discovers that his incapacity most
generally leads him into errors which convert the possible good
into actual evil; that, on account of his nature, birth, and
education, a very large number of men become involved in the
effects of his mistaken zeal, and that the world at large suffers
more from his existence than otherwise. Now, if, after arriving
at such results, M. seeks to carry out their logical conclusion,
viz., that being morally bound to diminish the woes to which
sentient beings on earth are subject, he should destroy himself,
and by that means do the only good he is capable of; is there, I
ask, any moral guilt involved in the act of anticipating death in
such a case? I, for one, should certainly say not. Nay, more, I
maintain, subject of course to correction by superior knowledge,
that M. is not only justified in making away with himself, but
that he would be a villain if he did not, at once and
unhesitatingly, put an end to a life, not only useless, but
positively pernicious. (4.) 

M. may be in error; but supposing he dies cherishing the happy
delusion that in death is all the good, in life all the evil he
is capable of, are there in his case no extenuating circumstances
to plead strongly in his favour, and help to avert a fall into
that horrible abyss with which your readers have been frightened?
(5.) 

M.'s, I repeat, is no hypothetical case. History teems with
instances of worthless and pernicious lives, carried on to the
bitter 1 end to the ruin of nations. Look at the authors of the
French Revolution, burning with as ardent a love for their
fellowmen as ever fired the human breast; look at them crimson
with innocent blood, bringing unutterable disasters on their
country in Liberty's sacred name! apparently how strong! in
reality how pitifully weak! What a woeful result of incapacity
has been theirs? Could they but have seen with M.'s eyes, would
they not have been his prototypes? Blessed, indeed, had it been
for France, if they had anticipated M.? 

Again, look at George III. of England, a well-meaning, yet an
incapable Sovereign, who, after reigning for a number of years,
left his country distracted and impoverished by foreign wars,
torn by internal dissensions, and separated from a kindred race
across the Atlantic, with the liberties of his subjects trampled
under foot, and virtue prostituted in the Cabinet, in Parliament
and on the Hustings. His correspondence with Lord North and
others abundantly proves that to his self-sufficiency,
well-meaning though it be, must be traced the calamities of Great
Britain and Ireland, calamities from the effects of which the
United Kingdom has not yet fully recovered. Happy had it been for
England if this ruler had, like M., seen the uselessness of his
life and nipped it, as M. might do, in the bud of its pernicious
career! 

 
AN
INQUIRER
 
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H P B -- EDITOR'S NOTES

(1.) "Inquirer" is not an Occultist, hence his assertion that in
some cases suicide "is not only justifiable, but also morally
desirable." No more than murder, is it ever justifiable, however
desirable it may sometimes appear. 

The Occultist, who looks at the origin and the ultimate end of
things, teaches that the individual--who affirms that any man,
under whatsoever circumstances, is called to put an end to his
life,--is guilty d as great an offense and of as pernicious a
piece of sophistry, as the nation that assumes a right to kill in
war thousands of innocent people under the pretext of avenging
the wrong done to one. 

All such reasonings are the fruits of Avidya mistaken for
philosophy and wisdom.

Our friend is certainly wrong in thinking that the writer of
Fragments arrived at his conclusions only because he failed to
keep before his mind's eye all the possible cases of suicide. The
result, in one sense, is certainly invariable; and there is but
one general law or rule for all suicides. But, it is just because
"the after-states" vary ad-infinitum, that it is as erroneous to
infer that this variation consists only in the degree of
punishment. If the result will be in every case the necessity of
living out the appointed period of sentient existence, we do not
see whence "Inquirer" has derived his notion that "the result is
invariably bad." 

The result is full of dangers; but there is hope for certain
suicides, and even in many cases A REWARD if LIFE WAS SACRIFICED
TO SAVE OTHER LIVES and that there was no other alternative for
it. Let him read para. 7, page 313, in the September THEOSOPHIST,
and reflect. Of course, the question is simply generalized by the
writer. To treat exhaustively of all and every case of suicide
and their after-states would require a shelf of volumes from the
British Museum's Library, not our Fragments. 

 

(2.) No man, we repeat, has a right to put an end to his
existence simply because it is useless. As well argue the
necessity of inciting to suicide all the incurable invalids and
cripples who are a constant source of misery to their families;
and preach the moral beauty of that law among some of the savage
tribes of the South Sea Islanders, in obedience to which they put
to death, with war-like honours, their old men and women.

The instance chosen by "Inquirer" is not a happy one. There is a
vast difference between the man who parts with his life in sheer
disgust at constant failure to do good, out of despair of ever
being useful, or even out of dread to do injury to his fellow-men
by remaining alive; and one who gives it up voluntarily to save
the lives either committed to his charge or dear to him. 

One is a half insane misanthrope the other, a hero and a martyr.
One takes away his life, the other offers it in sacrifice to
philanthropy and to his duty. The captain who remains alone on
board of a sinking ship; the man who gives up his place in a boat
that will not hold all, in favour of younger and weaker beings;
the physician, the sister of charity, and nurse who stir not from
the bed-side of patients dying of an infectious fever; the man of
science who wastes his life in brain-work and fatigue and knows
he is so wasting it and yet is offering it day after day and
night after night in order to discover some great law of the
universe, the discovery of which may bring in its results some
great boon to mankind; the mother that throws herself before the
wild beast, that attacks her children, to screen and give them
the time to fly; all these are not suicides.

The impulse which prompts them thus to contravene the first
great law of animated nature--the first instinctive impulse of
which is to preserve life--is grand and noble. And, though all
these will have to live in the Kama Loka their appointed life
term, they are yet admired by all, and their memory will live
honoured among the living for a still longer period. We all wish
that, upon similar occasions, we may have courage so to die. Not
so, surely in the case of the man instanced by "Inquirer."
Notwithstanding his assertion that "there is no moral cowardice
whatever involved" in such self-sacrifice--we call it decidedly
"moral cowardice" and refuse it the name of sacrifice. 

(3 and 4.) There is far more courage to live than to die in most
cases. If "M." feels that he is "positively mischievous," let him
retire to a jungle, a desert island; or, what is still better, to
a cave or hut near some big city; and then, while living the life
of a hermit, a life which would preclude the very possibility of
doing mischief to any one, work, in one way or the other, for the
poor, the starving, the afflicted. If he does that, no one can
"become involved in the effects of his mistaken zeal," whereas,
if he has the slightest talent, he can benefit many by simple
manual labour carried on in as complete a solitude and silence as
can be commanded under the circumstances. Anything is better even
being called a crazy philanthropist--than committing suicide, the
most dastardly and cowardly of all actions, unless the felo de se
is resorted to, in a fit of insanity. 

(5.) "Inquirer" asks whether his "M." must also be victim of that
transformation into spook and pisacha! Judging by the delineation
given of his character, by his friend, we should say that, of all
suicides, he is the most likely to become a séance-room spook.
Guiltless "of any moral turpitude," he may well be. But, since he
is afflicted with a "restless disposition which is perpetually
urging him on to make an effort to do good"--here, on earth,
there is no reason we know of, why he should lose that
unfortunate disposition (unfortunate because of the constant
failure)--in the Kama Loka. A "mistaken zeal" is sure to lead him
on toward various mediums. Attracted by the strong magnetic
desire of sensitives and spiritualists, "M." will probably feel
"morally bound to diminish the woes to which these sentient
beings (mediums and believers) are subject on earth," and shall
once more destroy, not only himself, but his "affinities" the
mediums. 

H P Blavatsky, Editor

Theosophist, November, 1882 

 
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Dallas

 



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