Theos-Talk Archives (February 2004 Message tt00180)

here's where it leads:



Explanation:
The False Dilemma fallacy occurs when an argument offers a false 
range of choices and requires that you pick one of them. The range 
is false because there may be other, unstated choices which would 
only serve to undermine the original argument. If you concede to 
pick one of those choices, you accept the premise that those choices 
are indeed the only ones possible. Usually, only two choices are 
presented, thus the term "False Dilemma"; however, sometimes there 
are three (trilemma) or more choices offered. 

This is sometimes referred to as the "Fallacy of the Excluded 
Middle" because it can occur as a misapplication of the Law of the 
Excluded Middle. This "law of logic" stipulates that with any 
proposition, it must be either true or false; a "middle" option 
is "excluded". When there are two propositions, and you can 
demonstrate that either one or the other must logically be true, 
then it is possible to argue that the falsehood of one logically 
entails the truth of the other. 

That, however, is a tough standard to meet - it can be very 
difficult to demonstrate that among a given range of statements 
(whether two or more), one of them absolutely has to be correct. It 
certainly isn't something which can simply be taken for granted, but 
this is precisely what the False Dilemma Fallacy tends to do. 

Examples and Discussion:
This fallacy can be considered a variation on the fallacy of 
Suppressed Evidence. By leaving out important possibilities, the 
argument is also leaving out relevant premises and information which 
would lead to better evaluation of the claims. 

Usually, the False Dilemma fallacy takes this form: 

1. Either A or B is true. A is not true. Therefore, B is true. 

As long as there are more options than A and B, then the conclusion 
that B must be true cannot follow from the premise that A is false. 
This makes an error similar to that found in the fallacy of Illicit 
Observation. One of the examples of that fallacy was: 

2. No rocks are alive, therefore all rocks are dead. 

We can reword it to: 

3. Either rocks are alive or rocks are dead. 

Whether phrased as an Illicit Observation or as a False Dilemma, the 
error in these statements lies in the fact that two contraries are 
presented as if they were contradictories. If two statements are 
contraries, then it is impossible for both of them to be true, but 
it is possible for both to be false. However, if two statements are 
contradictories, it is impossible for them to both be true or both 
be false. 

Thus, when two terms are contradictories, the falsehood of one 
necessarily implies the truth of the other. The terms alive and 
lifeless are contradictories - if one is true, the other must be 
false. However, the terms alive and dead are not contradictories; 
they are, instead, contraries. It is impossible for both to be true 
of something, but it is possible for both to be false - a rock is 
neither alive nor dead because "dead" assumes a prior state of being 
alive. 

Example #3 is a False Dilemma fallacy because it presents the 
options alive and dead as the only two options, on the assumption 
that they are contradictories. Because they are actually contraries, 
it is an invalid presentation. 

Belief in paranormal events can easily proceed from such false 
dilemmas: 

4. Either John Edward is a con-man, or he really can communicate 
with the dead. He seems too sincere to be a con-man, and I'm not so 
gullible that I can be easily fooled, therefore he communicates with 
the dead and there is an afterlife. 

Just such an argument was often made by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in 
his defenses of spiritualists. He, like so many of his time and 
ours, was convinced of the sincerity of those who claimed to be able 
to communicate with the dead, just as he was convinced of his own 
superior abilities to detect fraud. 

The argument above actually contains more than one False Dilemma. 
The first and most obvious problem is the idea that Edward must 
either be lying or genuine - it ignores the possibility that he has 
been fooling himself into thinking that he has such powers. 

A second False Dilemma is the unstated assumption that either the 
arguer is very gullible or can quickly spot a fake. It may be that 
the the arguer is indeed good at spotting fakes, but doesn't have 
the training to spot fake spiritualists. Even skeptical people 
assume that they are good observers when they aren't - that's why 
trained magicians are good to have in such investigations. 
Scientists have a poor history of detecting fake psychics because in 
their field, they are not trained to detect fakery - magicians, 
however, are trained in exactly that. 

Finally, in each of the false dilemmas, there is no defense of the 
option which is rejected. How do we know that Edward isn't a con-
man? How do we know that the arguer isn't gullible? These 
assumptions are just as questionable as the point under contention, 
so assuming them without further defense results in begging the 
question. 

Here is another example which uses a common structure: 

5. Either scientists can explain the strange objects seen in the sky 
over Gulf Breeze, Florida, or these objects are piloted by visitors 
from outer space. Scientists cannot explain these objects, so they 
must be visitors from outer space. 

This sort of reasoning actually leads people to believe many things, 
including that we are being watched by extraterrestrials. It is not 
uncommon to hear something along the lines of: 

6. If scientists (or some other authority) cannot explain event X, 
then it must be caused by (insert something unusual - aliens, 
ghosts, gods, etc.). 

But we can find serious fault with this reasoning even without 
denying the possibility of gods or ghosts or visitors from outer 
space. With a little reflection we can realize that it is quite 
possible that the unexplained images have ordinary causes that 
scientific investigators have failed to discover. Additionally, 
perhaps there is a supernatural or paranormal cause, but not the one 
being offered. 

In other words, if we think a little bit deeper, we can realize that 
the dichotomy in the first premise of this argument is false. 
Digging deeper will also often reveal that the explanation being 
offered in the conclusion does not fit the definition of explanation 
very well anway. 

This form of the False Dilemma fallacy is very similar to the 
Argument from Ignorance (Argumentum ad Ignorantium). Whereas the 
false dilemma presents the two choices of either scientists know 
what is going on or it must be supernatural, an appeal to ignorance 
simply draws conclusions from our general lack of information on the 
topic. 

This fallacy an also come very close to the Slippery Slope fallacy. 
Here is an example from the forum illustrating that: 

7. Without God and the Holy Spirit we all have our own ideas of what 
is right and wrong, and in a democratic system the the majority 
opinion determines right and wrong.Ê Someday they might vote in that 
there can only be so many kids per household, like in China.Ê Or 
they can take guns away from citizens.Ê If people don't have the 
Holy Spirit to convict them of what sin is, anything can happen! 

The last statement is clearly a False Dilemma - either people accept 
the Holy Spirit, or an "anything goes" society will be the result. 
There is no consideration given to the possibility of people 
creating a just society on their own. 

The main body of the argument, however, could either be described as 
a False Dilemma or as a Slippery Slope fallacy. If all that is being 
argued is that we must choose between believing in a god and having 
a society where the government dictates how many children we are 
allowed to have, then we are being presented with a false dilemma. 

However, if the argument is actually that rejecting belief in a god 
will, over time, lead to worse and worse consequences, including the 
government dictating how many children we may have, then we have a 
Slippery Slope Fallacy. 

No discussion of the False Dilemma Fallacy can ignore this famous 
example: 

8. America, love it or leave it. 

Only two options are presented: leaving the country, or loving it - 
presumably in the way that the arguer loves it and wants you to love 
it. Changing the country is not included as a possibility, even 
though it obviously should be. As you might imagine, this sort of 
fallacy is very common with political arguments: 

9. We must deal with crime on the streets before improving the 
schools. 
10. Unless we increase defense spending, we will be vulnerable to 
attack. 
11. If we don't drill for more oil, we will all be in an energy 
crisis. 

There is no indication that alternative possibilities are even being 
considered, much less that they might be better than what has been 
offered. Here is an example from the Letters to the Editor section 
of a newspaper: 

12. I don't believe any sympathy should be offered to Andrea Yates. 
If she were really that seriously ill, her husband should have had 
her committed. If she wasn't ill enough to be committed, then she 
was obviously sane enough to have made the decision to distance 
herself from her children and seek mental help with determination. 
(Nancy L.) 

Clearly there are more possibilities than what are offered above. 
Perhaps no one noticed how bad she was. Perhaps she suddenly got 
much worse. Perhaps a person sane enough not to be committed is not 
also sane enough to find help on her own. Perhaps she had too great 
a sense of duty towards her family to consider distancing herself 
from her children, and that was part of what led to her breakdown. 

The False Dilemma Fallacy is unusual, however, in that it is rarely 
sufficient to merely point it out. With the other Fallacies of 
Presumption, demonstrating that there are hidden and unjustified 
premises should be enough to get the person to revise what they have 
said. 

Here, however, you need to be willing and able to offer alternative 
choices which have not been included. Although the arguer should be 
able to explain why the offered choices exhaust all possibilites, 
you will probably have to make a case yourself - in doing so, you 
will be demonstrating that the terms involved are contraries rather 
than contradictories. 

There is a common religious argument, formulated by C. S. Lewis, 
which commits this fallacy and is similar to the above argument 
regarding John Edward: 

13. A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus 
said would not be a great moral teacher. He would either be a 
lunatic - on the level with a man who says he is a poached egg - or 
he would be the devil of hell. You must take your choice. Either 
this was, and is, the Son of God, or else a madman or something 
worse. You can shut Him up for a fool or you can fall at His feet 
and call Him Lord and God. But let us not come with any patronizing 
nonsense about His being a great human teacher. He has not left that 
open to us. 

This is a trilemma, and has become known as the "Lord, Liar or 
Lunatic Trilemma" because it is repeated so often by Christian 
apologists. By now, however, it should be clear that just because 
Lewis has only presented us with three options does not mean we have 
to sit by meekly and accept them as the only possibilities. 

Yet we cannot merely claim that it is a false trilemma - we have to 
come up with alternative possibilities while the arguer demonstrates 
that the above three exhaust all possibilities. Our task is easier: 
Jesus might have been mistaken. Or Jesus was severely misquoted. Or 
Jesus has been grossly misunderstood. We have now doubled the number 
of possibilities, and the conclusion no longer follows from the 
argument. 

If someone offering the above wishes to continue, she must now 
refute the possibility of these new alternatives. Only after it has 
been shown that they are not plausible or reasonable options can she 
return to her trilemma. At that point, we will have to consider 
whether still more alternatives can be presented. 

 















--- In theos-talk@yahoogroups.com, "kpauljohnson" 
<kpauljohnson@y...> wrote:
> Hey,
> 
> Neither of Daniel's links worked for me but I googled and came 
upon 
> Katinka's site which did:
> http://www.katinkahesselink.net/other/m_wolff.html
> 
> I must say I was disappointed by M-W's logic and assumptions at 
the 
> beginning, although not by all the analysis that followed. Having 
> heard only good things about him from people whose judgment I 
> respect, I wasn't prepared for this simplistic statement:
> 
> "the hypothesis that it was a massive but honest self-deception 
> seems well nigh unthinkable. It would seem that we must either 
view 
> the whole Theosophical conception as a fraud or else that it is 
just 
> what it claims to be."
> 
> I've seen the same assumption and argument from Baha'is about 
> Baha'u'llah, Christians about Jesus, ad nauseum. The person, or 
the 
> belief system can ONLY be either exactly what it claims to be, or 
> totally fraudulent. (M-W raises a third alternative of self-
> deception only to swat it down as "well nigh unthinkable." People 
> who describe an alternative as unthinkable are saying more about 
> their conceptual limitations than about reality.) 
> 
> Well, moving from theory to practice, has anyone ever OBSERVED a 
> person or belief system that was either totally fraudulent or 
> exactly what it claims to be? Even L. Ron Hubbard made one or two 
> true statements in his career, and even the most enlightened 
person 
> or system of ideas inevitably has a trace of misunderstanding 
> *somewhere.* Based on observation rather than speculation, I 
would 
> say that any teacher or teaching can and should be approached at 
> many levels and understood as a complicated mixture, if 
> understanding is our aim.
> 
> Merrell-Wolff's logical fallacy here is variously known as false 
> dilemma, excluded middle, etc. The first description of it I 
> googled upon was this:
>  
> 
http://atheism.about.com/library/FAQs/skepticism/blfaq_fall_falsedile
> mma.htm
> 
> A logical fallacy usually has negative consequences of some kind, 
> and here is where I see Merrell-Wolff going with his:
> 
> "The typical attacks that are based mainly, if not wholly, on the 
> argumentum ad hominem are contemptible and should be received with 
> scorn."
> 
> So we go from HPB either is exactly what and who she presented 
> herself to be or a complete fraud, no other choices allowed, to 
> anyone who criticizes her as a fraud is an object of my contempt 
and 
> everyone else ought to share that contempt. That's a not very 
> subtle form of bullying. Have seen that dozens of times from all 
> manner of true believers about various teachers, but didn't expect 
> it from this source.
> 
> Paul