Theos-Talk Archives (March 2002 Message tt00137)

>
> Hi Daniel,
>
> My comments are interlaced below.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Daniel Caldwell" <danielhcaldwell@yahoo.com>
> To: <danielhcaldwell@yahoo.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2002 9:05 AM
> Subject: 4 Step Process of Discovery: Possibility versus Probability
> as
> used in that process
>
>
> > In the realm of NORMAL historical inquiry, the
> > historians Barzun and Graff point out:
>
> Why capitalize normal? What is normal? Would reading the akasic record
as
> part of one's historical inquiry be considered normal?
>
> > > "If you receive a letter from a relative that [1]
> > bears what looks like her signature, that [2] refers
> > > to family matters you and she commonly discuss, and
> > that [3] was postmarked in the city where she lives,
> > > the probability is very great that she wrote it."
>
>
> agreed. But to leap from the probability of an ordinary event of
everyday
> life to the probability of an extraordinary event not witnessed before
nor
> since (i.e. raining inside a room) is a rather large leap wouldn't you
say?
> Or are you saying that the same evidentiary elements that prove Daniel
> Caldwell exists in time and space is sufficient to prove the existence of
> Santa Claus?
>
> > "The contrary hypothesis would need at least as many
> > > opposing signs [of evidence] in order to take root in
> > > your mind---though the possibility of forgery. . .is
> > always there."
> >
> >
>
> With all due respect to historians everywhere, counting pieces of
evidence
> is an impossible way to arrive at truth.
>
> > > Please note that the hypothesis that the letter is
> > really written by your relative is supported by three
> > > positive signs of evidence. But as Barzun and Graff
> > point out, even in spite of all that, the POSSIBILITY
> > > or PLAUSIBILITY of forgery is ALWAYS there! An critic
> > using the UNPACKING method [see:
> > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/theos-talk/message/4421
> > > ]
> > could take the ball at this step and try to "explain
> > > away" the three pieces of evidence.
> >
> > > For example, the skeptic could "reason":
> >
> > > "Isn't it possible or plausible that [1] the
> > relative's signature was forged, and, isn't it
> > > possible or plausible that [2] some "forger" was
> > somehow privy to family matters, and, furthermore,
> > > isn't it possible or plausible that [3] the forger
> > could have mailed the letter in the city where your
> > > relative lives to throw you off the track?"
>
>
> Daniel, you put your bias on display for our amusement when you use terms
> like 'explain away' and 'reason' in quotation marks in the context of
what
> someone who might hold a different opinion than you might do. You are
> using the elements of the well-known everyday event to support your
> assessment of a rare if not unique occurance.
>
> > And if you (the level-headed researcher) objected to
> > > such speculation by your resident skeptic, he might
> > quip:
> >
>
> You seem to deny the possibility that reasonable persons can disagree.
Is
> that your intention, or is your hypothesis such that those who disagree
> with
> 'the level-headed researcher' are being unreasonable?
>
> > > "Prove to me that the three statements, I just listed,
> > > aren't possible or plausible! Didn't Barzun and Graff
> > admit that THE POSSIBILITY OF FORGERY ...IS ALWAYS
> > THERE?"
> >
> >
>
> And if you would simply acknowledge the possibility or plausibility of
> alternative positions, we could make some progress. If you remain
> insistent
> that once the level headed researcher has determined which of the
> possibilities is probable and taken the audacious step of calling that
> probability 'the truth' that all the other possibilities cease to be,
then
> you will remain fixed in your beliefs and unable to move beyond them.
>
> > > But the perceptive researcher should point out to his
> > > skeptical friend that POSSIBILITIES and PLAUSIBILITIES
> > > [at step 2 in the 4 step process of discovery] are not
> > to be confused with PROBABILITIES [at step 4]. [See
> > > the chart outlining the 4 steps at:
> > > http://blavatskyarchives.com/history3.htm ]
> > >
> > > Barzun and Graffe clearly enunciate an important
> > > dictum for the researcher:
> > >
> > > "The rule of 'Give Evidence' is not be be violated. .
> > . .No matter how possible or plausible the author's
> > conjecture [at step 2] it cannot be accepted
> > > as truth [at step 4] if he has only his hunch [which
> > > is not evidence] to support it. Truth rests not on
> > possibility or plausibility but on probability.
> > > Probability [at step 4] means the balance of chances
> > > that, GIVEN SUCH AND SUCH EVIDENCE [at step 3], the
> > > event it records happened in a certain way; or, in
> > > other cases, that a supposed event did not in fact
> > take place."
> >
> >
>
> The body of evidence regarding materializations is rather large. If we
> take
> into account ALL the evidence instead of just SUCH AND SUCH we are
inclined
> to doubt the probability that a specific materialization happened in a
> certain way. However we acknowledge the possibility that it did. (which
> is
> more than you seem willing to do).
> Given all the evidence concerning the phenomenon of materialization I
> believe that the perceptive and level-headed researcher will conclude
that
> the balance of chances that any particular accounting of a
materialization
> is accurate is possible but not probable.
>
> >
> > > Unfortunately, far too many skeptics become fixated on
> > "possibilities" AND "plausibilities" [at step 2] and
> > > never progress beyond to considering "probabilities"
> > > [at step 4]. Such skeptics---after pointing out that
> > > if two or more explanations are possible or plausible,
> > none are
> > proved---SEEM TO BE UNINTERESTED in the question of
> > > where the WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE lies.
>
> Well at least you have shifted from counting pieces of evidence to
weighing
> them. Now weighing evidence is useful when judgement of particular
events
> is required. It is still a human activity and subject to major error. To
> conclude that the truth can be ascertained with certainty from a weighing
> of
> the evidence is wrong. Many individuals in jail have been freed and
> previous judgements of 'the truth' overturned when additional evidence
is
> brought to bear.
>
> > Many of these
> > > skeptics fixate and speculate (almost ad infinitum and
> > ad nauseam) on various possibilities and
> > > plausibilities --- hoping that careless readers will
> > > ASSUME that 'something' has been proven or disproven
> > by such rhetoric.
> >
>
> It is an error in judgement on your part to assume the motives of those
who
> would disagree with you are "hoping that careless readers will ASSUME
that
> 'something' has been proven or disproven by such rhetoric." I do not
> write
> for 'careless' readers and I could care less what a 'careless' reader
> assumes. I write so that I may study and learn from your responses.
>
> > [See:
> > > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/theos-talk/message/4423
> > > for a good example of how a critic can use this
> > "possibility/plausibility" method of argument.]
> >
> >
>
> To deny the possibilities is to live on a flat earth. To call
> probabilities
> the truth is to close the door on other possibilities.
> Why do that?
>
>
> regards,
> Bill
> > > =====
> > Daniel H. Caldwell
> > > BLAVATSKY ARCHIVES
> > > http://blavatskyarchives.com/introduction.htm
> > > "...Contrast alone can enable us to appreciate things at
> > their right value; and unless a judge compares notes and
> > > hears both sides he can hardly come to a correct decision."
> > > H.P. Blavatsky. The Theosophist, July, 1881, p. 218.
> >
> > >
> >
>